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Abstract—Recent research on the economic impact of data 
breach announcements on publicly listed companies was found 
to be sparse, with the majority of existing studies having a strong 
US bias. Here, a dataset of 45 data breach disclosures between 
2017 and 2019 relevant to European publicly listed companies 
was hand-gathered (from various sources) and detailed analyses 
of share price impact carried out using event study techniques 
with the aim of supporting business cases for firms to invest in 
cyber security. Differences from existing studies (in particular, 
the US market) are highlighted and discussed along with 
pointers to future research in this area. Although some evidence 
of negative cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the days 
surrounding the announcement were observed, along with one 
extreme case leading to insolvency, the results were not 
statistically significant overall with the notable exception of the 
Spanish market, which appeared to be more sensitive to data 
breaches, reacting rapidly. Therefore, justification for cyber 
security investment purely based on the market value effect of a 
data breach disclosure would be challenging. Other factors 
would need to be taken into consideration such as risk appetite, 
industry sector and nature of the information compromised as 
well as relevant legislation. Certain other observations were 
noted such as the lack of a comprehensive breach database for 
Europe (unlike US) and the effect of the introduction of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This research 
would be of benefit to business management, practitioners of 
cyber security, investors and shareholders as well as researchers 
in cyber security or related fields. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Research Background 
The Cyber Security Breaches Survey (Department for 
Digital, Media, Culture & Sport 2019) reports that 60+% of 
medium and large size firms in the UK “have identified 
[cyber] breaches or attacks”. In the year to June 2019, the 
Office for National Statistics (2019) cites 977,000 incidences 
of computer misuse for England and Wales alone, a figure 
including both personal and business-related hacking 
attempts. With the Data Protection Act (2018) now in force in 
the UK along with the equivalent ‘General Data Protection 
Regulation’ (GDPR) EU wide, firms must disclose any 
breaches involving personal data within 72 hours and face 
hefty fines of up to €20m or 4% of turnover (whichever is the 
greater) for failure to comply. 
In light of the above, as well as some recent high profile 
data breach disclosures such as that of British Airways 
(Bloomberg 2018), it would be reasonable to expect cyber 
security to be a major concern at board level for not only UK 
firms, but across Europe, and this research aims to investigate 
the impact of data breach announcements on the market value 
of publicly listed companies with a view to influencing 
investment in cyber security. Existing literature in this area 
was found to be somewhat sparse recently and exhibited a 
strong US bias, hence this paper will focus on European 
markets and compare/contrast with the literature. 
B. Research Aims and Objectives 
The primary aim of this research is to encourage firms 
(especially European listed) to invest in improving their cyber 
security posture through an understanding of the impact of 
data breach disclosures on market price. As well as adding to 
and updating the existing knowledge base of the economic 
impact of data breaches, another objective of this research 
would be to gain an understanding of differences between 
European markets and, in particular, the (more well 
researched) US markets in terms of the impact of data breach 
announcements. 
The following research questions were proposed in order 
to achieve the research aims and objectives: 
RQ1 What is the impact on company market value of a 
publicly announced data breach? 
RQ2 Through detailed analyses of the share price data can 
any patterns/correlations be found? 
RQ3 How can these findings be incorporated into 
companies’ cyber security investment strategies? 
RQ4 How does the data compare with existing literature? 
C. Research Benefits 
By gaining an up to date understanding of any potential 
negative impact of data breach related announcements on 
market value, this will highlight the importance of information 
security to business management as well as the need to invest 
in cyber security to avoid such incidents. Such insight would 
also assist practitioners of information security with business 
case justifications. This research would be of benefit to 
business management, practitioners of cyber security, 
investors and shareholders as well as researchers in cyber 
security or related fields. 
II. RELATED WORK 
The impact of publicly announced data breaches on market 
value (RQ1) is a topic which has been researched for some 
years. For example, Cavusoglu, Mishra, and Raghunathan 
(2004) reported that those firms suffering a serious data breach 
lost, on average, 2.1% of their market value within two days 
of the announcement, whereas Goel and Shawky (2009) cite a 
figure of around 1%. A recent literature review carried out by 
Spanos and Angelis (2018) noted that research in this area, 
despite its longevity, was “quite limited” although the 
majority (76%) of studies did show an impact of security 
 
events on company market value which was statistically 
significant. Indeed, even more recently, Lin et al. (2020) cited 
a loss of 1.44% on average over 5 days.  Tweneboah-Kodua, 
Atsu and Buchanan (2018: 646), who analysed breach events 
for 96 S&P5001 listed firms between 2013 and 2017, however 
did not find significant impact over shorter event windows and 
warn that “studying the cumulative effects of cyberattacks on 
prices of listed firms using event study methodology without 
grouping the firms into various sectors may not be 
informative”. Financial services sector firms, for example, 
showed larger abnormal returns over a 3-day event window 
than those in the technology sector, starting to provide input 
to RQ2. 
Consistent with Tweneboah-Kodua et al. (2018), 
Richardson, Smith and Watson (2019) also report a lesser 
effect on market price, citing an average of less than 0.3% 
based on an analysis of 827 breach disclosures for 417 
companies. Again, this was a US based study, the breach event 
data sourced from Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 2  (PRC). 
Richardson et al. (2019) chose propensity matched firms as a 
reference market rather than the more usual S&P500 
composite index which could explain why their findings are 
so different from Cavusoglu et al. (2004). Indeed, Kannan, 
Rees and Sridhar (2007) in their study found no significant 
impact either, also using control firms as a reference. An 
alternative explanation is provided by Yayla and Hu (2011) 
who note that the market appears to have become less 
sensitive to breach events in recent years – another factor to 
be mindful of in any analyses. 
Commenting on their findings, Richardson et al. (2019: 
249) argue that “companies are unlikely to change their 
investment patterns unless the cost of breaches increases 
dramatically or regulatory bodies enforce change” – a 
contribution towards RQ3. It is acknowledged, however, by 
Richardson et al. (2019) that exceptional events do occur with 
cases of massive data exposure having potentially catastrophic 
impact, suggesting a need to categorise data breaches 
according to their severity (RQ2), such as number of records 
exposed or level of data sensitivity. Campbell et al. (2003) 
observed that breaches involving unauthorised access to 
confidential data were more likely to result in significant 
negative market reaction. 
The above quotation from Richardson et al. (2019) also 
poses another question – what of the recent change of 
legislation (GDPR) in UK/EU, has there been any impact? As 
the introduction of GDPR is so recent (2018), literature in this 
area is rare, however Goel and Shawky (2014) carried out a 
similar US based study and observed that negative effects of 
security breaches were reduced significantly after the 
                                                          
1 Standard & Poor’s index of 500 US stocks representative of US markets 
in general 
enactment of security breach notification laws. In a recent 
study of the economic impact of GDPR infringement fine 
disclosures, Ford et al. (2021) observed negative returns of 
around 1% up to 3 days after the announcement with this loss 
of market valuation being far greater than the monetary value 
of the fine itself in almost all cases. Seemingly minor fines 
could result in huge losses even for firms having large market 
capitalisations.   
In summary, although there have been differences in 
results from studies related to the impact of data breach 
disclosures on market value, there are certainly some common 
themes such as: event study techniques (described below) are 
the favoured method for quantitative analyses and the research 
has a strong US bias, presumably because of readily accessible 
breach datasets for that market as well as a kind of ‘one size 
fits all’ market reference index in the S&P500, with a few 
notable exceptions such as Bose & Leung (2014). Thus, this 
research aims to go some way to address the deficit of 
European centric studies in this area although it should be 
recognised that literature searches were limited to English 




The high-level approach to this research will be to gather 
a dataset of data breach announcements for European publicly 
listed companies, then analyse the impact of these 
announcements on share price using an event study based 
approach. 
B. Event Studies 
Event studies have been widely used to assess the impact 
of specific events on the share price of firms and thereby their 
market value and are described in detail in, for example, 
MacKinlay (1997). A key assumption of this methodology is 
the ability of the market to reflect all available information as 
per the efficient market hypothesis (e.g. Fama 1970). By 
observing share price movements in reaction to information 
regarding a specific event, such as a data breach 
announcement over a short time period (the event window), it 
is possible to deduce how the market reacted to that specific 
event, given there are no other confounding events during that 
time-period. 
A common approach used in similar (data breach type) 
event studies is the market model (e.g. Cavusoglu et al. 2004; 
Andoh-Baidoo, Amoako-Gyampah & Osei-Bryson 2010; 
Hinz et al. 2015; Schatz & Bashroush 2016; Castillo & Falzon 
2018; Tweneboah-Kodua et al. 2018; Jeong, Lee & Lim 2019) 
2 https://privacyrights.org/ 
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which uses an estimation window prior to the (shorter) event 
window (see Figure 1) to predict movement of the firm’s stock 
based on a regression analysis. Returns are assumed to follow 
a single factor model (1) where the return of firm i on day t  
(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is dependent on the corresponding daily return of the 
reference market (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 ) and the extent of the security’s 
responsiveness (𝛽𝑖 ) offset by its abnormal return (𝛼𝑖 ). The 
error term 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is expected to be zero with finite variance. 
Abnormal returns are calculated for the event window (2) and 
reported as a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the 
whole event window (3). For cross-sectional analyses a 
cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) was calculated 
for N events as shown in equation (4). 
 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ⋅ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡) (2) 












The market model has been shown to stand up well against 
three and four factor models in similar studies. For example, 
Deane et al. (2019: 117) reported that the Fama–French–
Carhart (four factor) model “did not substantially differ from 
the market model”, an observation echoed by Richardson et 
al. (2019), Rosati et al. (2019) and Lin et al. (2020). 
C. Data Collection 
The scope for data collection was limited to breach 
announcements for companies (or their ultimate parents) 
publicly listed on a European exchange. Ownership of 
subsidiaries was confirmed through Dun & Bradstreet3. To 
maximise the initial data set, a broader geographic concept of 
Europe was used including both continental and trans-
continental countries, 52 ISO-3166 country codes in total. 
The manual data gathering exercise for European data 
breaches is described by the following steps (other breaches 
of relevance identified serendipitously were added, of 
course): 
 
1. Review monthly cyber security blogs4 for data breach 
announcements from 01/01/2017 stopping at 31/12/2019 
(to avoid possible market effects of COVID-19 which 
could be considered a long-term confounding event in 
itself). The resulting dataset would be centred roughly 
around the introduction of GDPR in May 2018 to help 
with before/after comparisons. 
2. Identify breaches of interest, namely those specific to 
European listed companies (or subsidiaries of European 
listed companies). Breach announcements regarding 
technology vulnerabilities which applied to multiple 
companies were disregarded. Privately owned 
                                                          
3 https://www.dnb.com 
4 Such as https://itgovernance.eu/blog and https://databreaches.net 
5 http://veriscommunity.net/vcdb.html 
companies were filtered out (e.g. Monzo, Yves-Rocher). 
Non-European examples filtered out included Everis 
Spain (Japan) and Three UK (Hong Kong). Also filtered 
out were cases where the ‘breach’ was only an allegation 
and the parent company immediately denied any breach 
had occurred e.g. Choice Hotels, British Airways. 
3. Perform internet searches for the earliest dated public 
announcement (thereby removing uncertainty around the 
event date). In each case the announcement was 
validated against multiple later disclosures. 
4. Where possible, additional data fields were gathered 
such as the nature of the breach, number of breached 
records and whether the incident involved personal data. 
 
After completing the above steps, the resulting dataset 
comprised 33 records. To supplement these, a useful potential 
data source relevant for Europe mentioned in the literature was 
the Breach Level Index (BLI) as provided by Gemalto (Thales 
Group 2017), however since its acquisition by Thales, this 
data source seems to be no longer publicly available. Instead, 
the VERIS Community Database (VCDB)5 was also reviewed 
as a possible data source, but data here was found to be sparse 
(only 8,857 records in total worldwide to date) having very 
little overlap with the hand-gathered dataset (actually only 
one, the UniCredit SpA incident). The original dataset was 
augmented by 12 breach disclosures as a result of the VCDB 
search bringing the total to 49 records. Such a sample size is 
nowhere near that used by e.g. Richardson et al. (2018) of 827 
records but, nevertheless, closer to that of Tweneboah-Kodua 
et al. (2018) at 96. The difficulty of obtaining a breach 
database of similar size to these US based studies does, again, 
underpin favouritism towards this market by researchers due 
to accessibility of data and highlight the need for a European 
equivalent as there is no reason to believe European 
companies are not just as susceptible to data breaches as their 
US counterparts! 
Share price and market index data were sourced from 
Yahoo!Finance (2019) along with firm demographics such as 
industry sector. For each ultimate parent company, the most 
appropriate reference index was selected, ideally one of which 
the candidate firm was a component but adjusted to closest 
match when data could not be extracted from Yahoo!Finance. 
This selection of the reference market is important (Kannan et 
al. 2007; Richardson et al. 2019). Some firms had multiple 
listings in which case the primary listing was favoured along 
with the associated index. Share price data were not available 
for all of the 49 records and a further four had to be removed 
namely Npower, Quickbit and Debenhams (no longer listed) 
as well as CD Projekt Red (no data currently available pre-
2021). This left 45 events going forwards for analysis. 
D. Data Analysis 
To facilitate the analyses, R (R Core Team 2018)6 scripts 
were developed to extract share price and index data directly 
from Yahoo!Finance for each of the 45 events and then event 
studies run using an R package (Schimmer, Levchenko & 
Müller 2014) 7 using the market model as described above. 
Non-trading event days were defaulted to the next available 
trading day. An estimation window of 120 days was chosen 
6 R version 4.0.3 (2020-10-10) 
7 EventStudy package version 0.36.900 (API version 0.374-alpha) 
 
consistent with e.g. Goel and Shawky (2009), Andoh-Baidoo 
et al. (2010), Schatz and Bashroush (2016), Richardson et al. 
(2019). In all cases the estimation window ended one trading 
day before the event window. Tweneboah-Kodua et al. (2018: 
641) recommend avoiding overlap of the estimation and 
event windows in this way to avoid “parameter 
contamination”. Although the event window should be broad 
enough to contain any uncertainty in the date of the event, the 
longer the window the less likely it is to detect abnormal 
returns (Dyckman, Philbrick & Stephan 1984). Previous 
studies have shown market reaction before the event date due 
to information leakage. For example, using event study 
techniques, Lin et al. (2020) show significant evidence of 
opportunistic pre-official announcement insider trading 
related to data breaches. For this study, a range of event 
windows were initially chosen starting from up to two days 
before the event and varying in length from two to fifty8 
trading days in order to give visibility of these effects and 
others such as sector specific effects reported by e.g.  
Tweneboah-Kodua et al. (2018).  
E. Hypothesis Development 
For event studies, the null hypothesis maintains that there 
are no abnormal returns within the event window. The 
standard deviation of abnormal returns during the event 
window is described by equation (5) where 𝑀𝑖 refers to the 
number of non-missing returns. The t-value for the CAR over 
the event window was then calculated according to equation 
(6). 
 
















   
For cross-sectional analyses the t-statistic (𝑡𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 ) was 
calculated based on the CAAR as shown in (8) with 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅  
being the standard deviation of the CARs for each firm i 
across the sample of size N (7). 
 








   






This approach to significance testing is consistent with 
e.g. Castillo and Falzon (2018), Deane et al. (2019) and Jeong 
et al. (2019). Indeed, Deane at al. (2019: 115) state that “the 
t test is considered to be the best framework for analyzing 
statistical significance in most event study frameworks and to 
be relatively robust”. 
                                                          
8 The limit of this software for CAR event windows was 50 days. For 
longer windows the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) approach is 
recommended. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
To identify any significant CAR (RQ1) an initial 
visualisation similar to Figure 3 showed that Travelex was a 
major outlier (having a CAR of -75% over a 3-day window) 
and would fall into the category which Richardson et al. 
(2019: 248) describe as “those rare situations involving 
massive data exposures”. The company has since gone into 
administration citing both the cyber-attack and COVID-19 
effects as contributing factors (The Guardian 2020). Since this 
event occurred on 31/12/2019 it was at the limit of the data 
selection range and the event window would certainly extend 
into potential ‘COVID-19 territory’. Therefore, Travelex was 
excluded from further analyses leaving 44 breach events 
remaining. These residual events were re-visualised as shown 
in Figure 3. No obvious evidence of information leakage prior 
to the announcement date (e.g. Lin et al. 2020) was observed 
with, in fact, slightly positive CAAR being observed for event 
windows (-2, 2), (-1, 1) and (-1, 0). Studies where there was 
uncertainty around the announcement date favoured event 
windows such as these to ensure abnormal returns were not 
missed (e.g. Schatz & Bashroush 2016) but here all dates were 
validated. Nevertheless, the expectation based on previous 
studies would be to see market reaction kicking in 1-2 days 
after the event, growing to a maximum and disappearing over 
longer event windows. What can be seen here is that the 
market reaction appears to be much slower overall with no 
visible negative trend until the (0, 5) window at the earliest, 
disappearing the following day and subsequently reappearing 
a month after the event (0, 20). These longer windows 
operating at the outer limits of event study methodology also 
seem to be skewed by outliers such as NatWest enjoying, 
surprisingly, a positive run following their breach 
announcement and Fox-IT along with The AA falling over 
20%. That Fox-IT, a cyber security specialist company itself, 
suffered such a negative market reaction would certainly come 
as no surprise, albeit seemingly somewhat late. Clearly there 
is a need to look more deeply here into the nature of the 
businesses affected (beginning to answer RQ2) as 
recommended by Tweneboah-Kodua et al. (2018) and 
Bendovschi, Al-Nemrat and Ionescu (2016). 
 
Figure 2: CAAR by industry sector 
 For this purpose, a graph of CAAR by sector for each 
event window is shown in Figure 2. It appears that the fastest 
negative reaction to a breach is, indeed, shown by the 
technology sector peaking two days after the disclosure in the 
short term. Financial and communication services companies 
 
show little reaction at all over this time period which is 
somewhat unexpected based on previous studies. The basic 
materials sector shows the largest short term negative impact 
after five days although it should be noted that there was only 
one company (Norsk Hydro) assigned to this sector, so it made 
sense to choose the (0, 2) window for a closer look at sector 
performance. The results are shown in Table 1. Although 4 
sectors show negative CAAR for this event window, the 
average impact is still slightly positive (0.001) over all 44 
events and the negative CAARs are not statistically significant 
thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis for these. However, 
the CAAR is significant at the 5% level for the consumer 
defensive sector but in a positive way with the share prices 
rising over 1% in response to the breach disclosure. 
Companies in this sector, however, could reasonably be 
expected to outperform under adversity due to their defensive 
nature. 
 Not having found evidence of negative impact so far, the 
observation of Richardson et al. (2019) regarding massive 
breach volumes leading to more serious effects warrants 
investigation. Where it was possible to gather an indication of 
the number of records breached, this information was added 
to the dataset (25 examples). It can be seen that the financial 
services sector was responsible for over 99% of all the records 
breached, in all cases involving sensitive (personal) data and 
the majority (55%) being GDPR relevant, thus it seems 
somewhat surprising the market reaction is not more severe.
 
Table 1: Analysis of event window (0, 2) by sector 
Industry Sector N CAAR SCAAR tCAAR  
Negative 
CAR % Total Records Breached Personal % GDPR % 
Technology 4 -0.0188 0.0390 -0.9656  50 - 75 75 
Financial Services 11 -0.0036 0.0250 -0.4730  55 1,360,584,255 100 55 
Communication Services 8 -0.0015 0.0193 -0.2124  50 3,117,453 88 75 
Industrials 8 -0.0007 0.0345 -0.0574  38 404,700 50 75 
Basic Materials 1 0.0098    0 - 0 100 
Consumer Cyclical 8 0.0124 0.0250 1.4021  25 358,000 88 75 
Consumer Defensive 3 0.0158 0.0034 7.9690 ** 0 17,295 33 67 
Healthcare 1 0.0190    0 - 0 100 
 44 0.0010    39 1,364,481,703 75 70 
*,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.    
 




Figure 4: CAR versus records breached 
 Figure 4 gives an idea of a correlation between the number 
of records breached (logarithmic scale) and CAR for a 
selection of the more interesting event windows. There 
appears to be a weak trend that CARs become more negative 
the more records there are breached which becomes stronger 
with the longer windows. As event studies are better suited to 
the days immediately surrounding it was decided to focus on 
other, more major factors. Campbell et al. (2003) noted that 
breaches involving sensitive personal data led to more 
negative CARs. For this reason, the sector analysis in Table 1 
was rerun restricting the dataset to only those events involving 
sensitive (personal) data and the results are shown in Table 2. 
This had the effect of altering the mean CAAR from a slightly 
positive value to a slightly negative value (0.001 to -0.001). 
Despite the reduction in events to 33, the financial services 
sector was unaffected meaning all 11 events involved 
sensitive data. The technology sector became 37% more 
negative yet the results are still not statistically significant for 
any sector. Thus, the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns 
still stands.                                  
Table 2: Analysis of event window (0, 2) by sector (personal data) 
Goel and Shawky (2014) observe that the introduction of 
data breach notification laws led to a reduction in negative 
market reaction. For this purpose, Table 3 shows an analysis 
of abnormal returns for four particularly negative event 
windows, both before and after the enactment of the GDPR, 
for the above set of 33 events specifically involving personal 
data. In three of the four cases, pre-GDPR negative CAAR 
was turned positive after enactment and, even in the fourth 
                                                          
9 The FTSE100 and FTSE250 combined. 
case, the negative CAAR was reduced over 90%. 
Unfortunately, the results were only statistically significant (at 
the 10% level) for the longer event windows pre-GDPR and 
these longer-term event study observations are known to be 
less reliable. 
Table 3: Market effect of GDPR enactment 
Event 
Window GDPR N CAAR SCAAR tCAAR  
Negative 
CAR % 
(0, 2) PRE 12 -0.0079 0.0267 -1.0260  50 
(0, 2) POST 21 0.0033 0.0257 0.5953  43 
(0, 5) PRE 12 -0.0114 0.0281 -1.4023  75 
(0, 5) POST 21 0.0039 0.0303 0.5946  48 
(0, 30) PRE 12 -0.0564 0.0916 -2.1330 * 83 
(0, 30) POST 21 -0.0047 0.0791 -0.2702  57 
(0, 50) PRE 12 -0.0592 0.1101 -1.8645 * 83 
(0, 50) POST 21 0.0022 0.1135 0.0881  62 
*,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Finally, an analysis by market reference was carried out 
(Table 5) to give, effectively, a geographic breakdown and see 
which markets were more sensitive to data breach 
announcements. Of the shorter event windows, (0, 1) proved 
to be of particular interest as this was the first real evidence of 
a statistically significant abnormal return (at the 5% level), 
specifically related to the Spanish market (IBEX35). Although 
there were only four breach events relevant to this market, 
they spanned three different industry sectors, three out of four 
were GDPR relevant, and half and half sensitive versus non-
sensitive data therefore, it seems, the market itself was the 
common factor here. One of these breaches was, however, by 
far the largest (TSB/Sabadell) so volume could have played a 
part. The most negative impact for this 2-day window was that 
of the AEX25 (Netherlands) at around -3.8%, but there was 
only one example here (ING Bank). It is interesting to note 
that the FTSE3509 index would effectively cover 17 (39%) of 
the events so there was a strong UK bias here. As an additional 
check on the importance of the reference index (Kannan et al. 
2007; Richardson et al. 2019), the sector analysis (Table 1) 
was rerun using the SPEUR35010 as a reference across all 
events. The resulting abnormal returns are shown in Table 4.  
Table 4: Analysis of event window (0, 2) by sector (SPEUR350) 
Industry Sector N CAAR SCAAR tCAAR  
Negative 
CAR % 
Technology 4 -0.0213 0.0356 -1.1955  50 
Financial 
Services 
11 -0.0051 0.0241 -0.7056  45 
Communication 
Services 
8 -0.0003 0.0199 -0.0445  38 
Industrials 8 0.0000 0.0369 -0.0010  38 
Consumer 
Cyclical 
8 0.0107 0.0243 1.2415  38 
Consumer 
Defensive 
3 0.0165 0.0080 3.5875 * 0 
Basic Materials 1 0.0179   0 
Healthcare 1 0.0248    0 
 44 0.0008    36 
*,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
10 Standard & Poor’s index of 350 stocks representative of European 
markets in general 
Industry Sector N CAAR SCAAR tCAAR  
Negative 
CAR % 
Technology 3 -0.0259 0.0446 -1.0040  67 
Communication 
Services 
7 -0.0061 0.0152 -1.0623  57 
Financial 
Services 
11 -0.0036 0.0250 -0.4730  55 
Industrials 4 0.0063 0.0266 0.4725  25 
Consumer 
Defensive 
1 0.0130    0 
Consumer 
Cyclical 
7 0.0138 0.0266 1.3720  29 
 33 -0.0008    45 
 *,**,*** Indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 5: Analysis by market index for event window (0, 1) 
The overall mean CAAR only differs by 0.0002 and the 
results look very similar, with again only the consumer 
defensive sector showing statistical significance but this time 
only at the 10% level. Using market specific indices produced 
higher 𝑡𝐶𝐴𝑅  values on average so this was the preferred 
method (cf. Bose & Leung 2014). 
CONCLUSION 
 Overall we have seen no clear impact on share price of data 
breach announcements (RQ1) in European companies across 
all sectors and markets other than Spain. Based on this 
evidence it is difficult to support business cases for investment 
in cyber security measures (RQ3), although there could be 
other approaches as Deane et al. (2019) report a significant 
uplift in share price for organisations following an 
announcement related to security certification. Thus, 
justification for investment would have to depend on other 
factors such as risk appetite (no company wants to be the next 
Travelex), industry sector, nature of the data compromised 
and relevant legislation. These findings are consistent with 
Richardson et al. (2019) who refer to their observations on the 
(lack of) economic impact of data breach announcements as 
“much ado about nothing” yet other, mostly earlier, US based 
research in this area did find significant evidence of negative 
market reaction supporting the finding of Yayla and Hu 
(2011) that markets were becoming less sensitive to data 
breach disclosure over time. That said, the Spanish market 
(RQ2) showed statistically significant and rapid sensitivity to 
data breach announcements, continuing after the enactment of 
GDPR. Other European markets showed a slight reduction in 
negative CAR post-GDPR as predicted by Goel and Shawky 
(2014) but, again, not statistically significant. At the time of 
writing the Spanish data protection authority (AEPD) has 
issued more GDPR infringement fines (236 examples) than 
any other (CMS Legal 2021) so perhaps this is a contributing 
factor to the higher market sensitivity towards data breaches 
in Spain. 
 Some differences with US markets were identified, for 
example, the slower response of the European financial 
services sector (RQ4). The specific case of Travelex also fits 
with the observations of Richardson et al. (2019) that in the 
case of particularly severe breaches, the situation may become 
irrecoverable, although COVID-19 was cited as a contributing 
factor in its demise. Following on from this some evidence of 
a (weak) correlation between negative CAR and number of 
records breached was identified, but not really in the short 
term. Nevertheless, this should be borne in mind for any risk 
assessment along with the nature of the data itself. 
 One shortcoming identified as part of this research was the 
lack of a publicly available breach database like, for example, 
PRC which features heavily in similar US based studies. 
Although the VCDB project seems well-intentioned as a 
global research resource, what is really needed is a much more 
comprehensive and richer dataset in order to study European 
and other markets to a depth equivalent to that of US research 
in this area. Although this study has begun to look at the 
economic impact of GDPR this is another potential area for 
future research once the market stabilises and more data 
becomes available. It must be recognised that these disclosure 
events are early in the cyber security incident lifecycle and, 
although appearing no more than a nuisance to the markets 
generally, there may well be more surprises to follow 
depending on how effectively they are managed. 
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